Revolution In Mind:
The Creation Of Psychoanalysis

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Suppose we were to say that today we are all committed to the notion of pluralism in psychoanalysis? It is a big umbrella, a big tent, and everyone is welcome. You can avoid hard questions by saying that, including the hard question that forced itself on me.

Orthodoxy has collapsed and it is fantastic to have a wide-open, interesting debate. But the question for me was: What are the boundaries of psychoanalysis and how do we decide? This is a question that would seem answerable via historical analysis. And yet, when I turned to the history of psychoanalysis, I found that it was only marginally addressed. In fact, the history of psychoanalysis had been dominated, very powerfully, by one central historiographic method, the method, I think, that organized both talks earlier today which is biography.

In biography, there is a central focus on great men or women, whether they be great for the good or the evil they created. But the focus in the history of psychoanalysis has been predominantly the method of biography. We have forty to fifty full-scale biographies of psychoanalysts. We also have intellectual histories that pull ideas out of their social-cultural contexts and give you a history of ideas, like Reuben Fine's book, The History of Psychoanalysis. The critical thing to know about Reuben Fine is that he was a chessmaster and he wrote like a chessmaster: a paragraph is a move, a new paragraph, a new title. He keeps breaking things up into little paragraphs. There is idea after idea without the historical social context. There is no way to consider questions like the sociology of knowledge, and how this community has formed itself. There are also social histories, some, but very few. I discovered that no one had written an overarching intellectual and social history of psychoanalysis from its birth. With all the books on Freud, Jung, and psychoanalysis, it had never been done before.

So I attempted to write one – something to account for two big questions: How did these ideas come together to create this new intellectual force? How did these ideas attract a community that then took up these ideas and

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spread them through the social world? This second question is about social history, the actors in a particular period of time. For answers, I will give you a summary of my 600-page book, Revolution in Mind.

To write this account, I had to come up with a method that would do two things. First I turned to Thomas Kuhn (1970) and his famous notion of scientific revolution. He said there is this thing called normal science, predicated on a community sharing the same assumptions, the same paradigms, until so many anomalies accrue that there is a paradigm shift, and that is what causes a scientific revolution.

I found this to be a very powerful model. The problem was that it assumed psychoanalysis was going to function like a science, and that is an open, complicated question. I did not want to start off from the get-go, closing down questions of “What exactly is psychoanalysis?” Kuhn’s model was attached to the hard sciences, astronomy and physics. So I thought, this model is going to preclude possibilities. I need a more flexible model. So I turned to the model from literary criticism called “interpretative communities.” Basically this is the idea that I am going to use to think about how different communities create themselves in psychoanalysis, how they create order and boundaries.

Stanley Fish said, “If you read Milton, and you read a complete commentary on Milton, the commentary has very little to do with Milton. It has a lot to do with the time and place where it was written. There are interpretative communities which come together in a time and a place. They all read Milton in the same way. Then another group comes along. They read John Milton in a completely different interpretative frame; that is to say, the interpretative frame of the readers reconstitutes the text and the author’s intentions.

This is a powerful idea that had a basis in French thought and was taken up by historians: the notion of a discursive community which has a way of talking about shared interpretative strategies that distinguish meaning for that specific social group within a specific time and place.

I adopted this model because it integrates intellectual and social history. It has a place for the power of ideas. It also has a powerful place for social, political and cultural forces, bringing people together and breaking people apart. So it integrates intellectual and social history; it is highly historicist. That is to say that it is very much about people in a time and a place. Another thing I like is that it is very flexible, very vague. I need not look at the history of psychoanalysis in a highly pre-determined way.

To start, there are a number of rules that, I found, organize discursive communities in psychoanalysis during the time I studied, from its origins until
the collapse of European psychoanalysis with World War II. Analysts then had a strategy for definition. That is to say, there is always a commitment at the border that says if you agree with this, you are in; if you do not, you are out. There was never a time when there was not such a border commitment. It could be more or less demanding, but there were always border commitments.

The second rule was that, once you were in some of the psychoanalytic communities, there were various degrees of interpretive variance. In some psychoanalytic communities, interpretation was highly regulated. In others there were different degrees of autonomy. I want to look at how much was dictated and what were the degrees of autonomy. Once you got in, how much intellectual freedom was allowed, how much was dictated to you? This can be called the degree of autonomy in the field.

Third, there was always a shared object of inquiry. These were the three basic rules that structured my historical analysis of what happened when psychoanalysis was created, schismed, re-grouped and then finally, tragically, was crushed in Central and Western Europe and shipped into exile.

My book is divided into three connected, sequential sections: Making Freudian Theory, Making The Freudians, and Making Psychoanalysis.

In Making Freudian Theory, I argue that Sigmund Freud was not an original genius. That is the old historical notion, that Freud came up with almost all of his ideas through his extraordinary powers of analysis and observation with his patients and with his own self-analysis. This is the old historiographic notion. It has been undermined by twenty-five years of people saying, “He got this idea here; he got this idea there.” It came to the point where there was a consolidated view that Freud had never come up with an original idea in his life, that he was basically a plagiarist who stole them. You see parallels between him and the great thinkers, e.g. Plato, Spinoza, Hegel. I might have missed some things, because no one in a letter ever wrote about it, but there was so much false attribution, that I decided that I wanted to use every piece of documented evidence I could find, and only that.

I concluded that Sigmund Freud was an extraordinarily powerful integrative synthesizer, an interdisciplinatory thinker. To create the first model of psychoanalysis, he went into three already preexisting disciplines, absorbed the language, lock, stock and barrel, came up with a little minor syntheses for each field that he then combined, opening up the possibility for a completely new field. The three preexisting fields Freud entered were French psychopathology, biophysics/psychophysics, and sexology.

The beginning of psychoanalysis for me starts with La Psychologie Nouvelle in France in 1870, an attempt by Theodule Ribot to create a scientific psychology. The idea went beyond prior psychology, which intermixed
supernatural notions of soul, Christian notions, with naturalist notions of psychology. He was only going to have a naturalistic scientific psychology. In 1870, Ribot had a lot of support for this. However, it was not clear how he would make good on the claim of building a scientific psychology, especially when the great avatar of science, Comte, said, “Psychology could never be a science.” Still, he was only going to have a naturalistic psychology and in 1870 people were all for this.

After 2000 years’ history of psychological pursuit, Auguste Comte wrote in 1855, “No one proposition is established to the satisfaction of followers; they are divided into a multitude of schools, still disputing about the elements of their doctrine. This use of interior observation gave birth to almost as many theories as there were observers.” Nonetheless, Ribot moved forward. He decided to build a psychology based on three planks.

First, individual analysis of inner experience which happened through a theoretically minimal kind of association, psychology derived from Locke and the British empiricists. It said basically, “The mind is a loom; it sees the big animal on the hill, it hears the moo, it learned the word cow, and all three are synthesized into an immediate unified experience, that is, a cow mooing on the hill.” It is an associational model. This model also had a notion of psychopathology, which consisted of misassociation, e.g., that is a dog but you think it’s a cow (Locke called it “the madness of everyday men,” a model for madness.) And there could be disassociation, ideas that should be connected but somehow are not.

The second plank would examine psychological function as a study of psychological heredity. Memory was going to be studied through family charts, who had had memories and good memories, level of cognition, etc. The function would be analyzed through genealogy and ultimately it raised the notion of bad heredity.

For the third plank: Ribot said, It is a little hard to do experimental psychology. How do you do the experiment? We are going to do what Claude Bernard said people in medicine do. We are going to look at nature’s experiments, that is, psychopathology. This is how we are going to reason back to psychology, by what goes wrong. This put Ribot in touch with neurologists and psychiatrists, most famously Jean Martin Charcot.

Charcot, the great neurologist, who started off as an epiphenomenalistic, did not think that mind mattered at all. The brain matters. Mind did not have causal force. He was not, therefore, interested in psychology. Yet he was forced to take interest in psychology by his observation of traumatic paralysis.

What was that? For example, A French worker comes to the Salpêtrière hospital. Four days earlier a beam had fallen on his arm. He had been knocked
to the ground. Terrified, he had a passing thought: “Oh, my God, I cannot move my arm.” He got up, shook himself off. His arm was fine. He went about his daily work. The next day his arm became paralyzed. At the Salpêtrière, they already knew enough about nerve distribution to realize that this paralysis did not conform to neuroanatomical distribution. It was therefore by definition, hysterical.

What had happened? They decided that the idea he had, “Oh, my God, I can’t move my arm” had become disassociated by the shock of the event, so that it operated with impunity on the body. It was an unconscious idea that operated on the body, a trauma, an unconscious idea that caused a “paralysis of the imagination.”

This is the model that Sigmund Freud saw when he came to the Salpêtrière, a model that included some psychogenesis. There is another part of it: the only people who have dissociations like this are those whose association functions are weak, not normal. They are degenerates. This is where Freud arrives in Paris. He returns home and he has “drunk the Kool-Aid” — he is a Charcotian.

Charcot’s man in Vienna: that is going to be the core of Freud’s career. He has planned it out, he can now get married, he has found a way to translate Charcot into German, so that this was going to be a calling card for him as the guy in Vienna who does French psychopathology. He had adopted association psychology, hypnosis, psychogenesis, the possibility of unconscious psychological causes, and he was ready to prosper.

Just as he set himself up, French psychopathology came under very serious attack. What was the problem? There were a couple. The first was that Ribot’s scientific psychology did explain a lot of functional disturbance with degeneration and Charcot had made claims that almost everything was degenerate. He had a wide spectrum of disorders which were all degenerate and all tied to the same roots in the family tree. You would have rheumatoid arthritis, general paralysis of the insane, hysteria, alcoholism and they were all generally due to the same degeneracy. Not only was this highly questionable outside of France, as in Vienna, but there were serious scientific challenges to the notion via the debates about locomotor ataxia.

Charcot named locomotor ataxia, this was his baby, but what had become clear was that over 95% of the patients had syphilis infections. It became highly dubious that this disability was not due to syphilis infection. Even in Salpêtrière where Charcot ruled, his junior people were beginning to say, This is germ theory: this has nothing to do with degeneration. Charcot was upset. He wrote Freud a letter and said, “Why does the number 95% mean so much to them. What about the other 5%?” (Gelfand, 1988).
This was a challenge. It made people start to think, “If this is wrong, what else might be misattributed to degeneration?” Hysteria?

Next came that famous challenge to Charcot’s way of creating objectivity in his encounter with hystericism, and the use of hypnosis. Bernheim (1889) came along and said, I can not reproduce any of those four stages for hystericism. (Charcot claimed that there were regular four stages in hysterical attack, documented by photography.) Bernheim said, “No one can reproduce this. This is a hysteria of culture. The people who are hystericism are the doctors.”

This was quite a challenge, and sadly for Charcot, the numbers started to pile up against him. People tried and could not reproduce his results. This was a crisis for Freud who set himself up in Vienna as Charcot’s man. What does Freud do? This is a crisis that illustrates something Freud does over and over again, characteristic of him. He comes up with a powerful synthetic position. His starting point is not so original. He is trying to wrestle with Bernheim, Charcot, general paralysis of the insane, degeneracy. What do you do? What does he come up with? Again some of us will be very familiar with the answer. It is going to last for the next fifty years.

He rejects Bernheim’s challenge that you can never have empirical understanding in psychology. Everyone is suggesting back and forth between doctor and patient. There is no way you can figure out where anything came from. It is similar to transference/countertransference without the terms.

Freud said, Bernheim is right, it does happen, but he is wrong for not thinking that you can understand scientifically the intrapsychic part of the hysteric that allows him or her to be so susceptible to suggestion. Suggestion happens all the time, but why are these people so suggestible? That is an intrapsychic function and that can be understood with an empirical observer. Therefore, take interpersonal dynamics and root them intrapsychically. This is going to be the Freudian move for the next fifty years.

What about degeneration? Freud rejects Charcot’s use of degeneration, which is being used for anti-Semitic purposes. So in some ways that may have helped. Sander Gilman and others argued that Freud saw the weakness in this theory. Charcot and Ribot both thought that a lot of those family trees were great for studying the Jews because they have all those illnesses. Freud believed this when he went to Paris. He wrote his fiancée (1960) saying, Charcot is amazing and by the way there is all the stuff about heredity and I have a crazy uncle and all the Jews are like that.

He went back to Vienna and changed his mind. Maybe Charcot was overextending the notion of degeneration, but then, what did cause hysteria? He adopted Charcot’s thinking on traumatic paralysis and now extended it, not to be due to a degenerative brain that is not associating very well, but simply
to trauma, disassociation, unconscious ideas. He is against Charcot this way, for part of Charcot; against Bernheim this way; with Bernheim that way. It is a synthesis that ends up having quite a great deal of power.

In 1895 when *Studies On Hysteria* gets published, it is a book on French psychopathology. Freud and Breuer say, we are deeply indebted to Professor Charcot and we are extending his notions of trauma and traumatic process to what we are going to call “traumatic hysteria.” In this book there is a lot of French stuff that is very common to French thinking about pathology.

There are two central innovations. One is Breuer’s cathartic therapy and the other is Freud’s notion that traumatic ideas become unconscious and cause hysteria due to psychic defense. Transference appears in that book for the first time, but the central idea introduced—completely novel, to my mind—was that psychic defense creates neurosis. It is not the beam falling on your arm. It is a struggle that is internal. That was a very novel suggestion. In fact, it was such a novel suggestion that it sent Freud off on a journey, because the search became, for him—and at this point Freud’s identity was not in doubt; he is trying to be a scientist of the mind—finding a scientifically plausible model of the mind, where such a thing as psychic defense, a self-regulating mind where that kind of mind is possible, where it makes sense.

What does he do? Well, in fact, he leaves French psychopathological discourse and goes to very different discourse to try to come up with a very different model. This is why the French said for the next thirty years that Freud ripped them off, stole his ideas from Charcot and Janet.

They were wrong. In fact, the Freudian synthesis leaves the French discourse and goes to a very German discourse which I call biophysics and psychophysics. I can even call it metaphysics. This follows a hundred years of competing models of the mind/brain that start with Immanuel Kant, and after Kant a whole slew of models that try to take into account mental cause, subjectivity as causal. That is found in Fechner, Schopenhauer, in the scientists of that time, in Johannes Muller and the nature philosophers, who saw mind and brain, mind and body as deeply influencing each other.

If, in fact, Freud wanted a model for mind that could self-regulate, could have force against itself, he would have had a lot to choose from, in the 1830’s and ’40s. In 1895 it was a different story, because that whole movement had been routed, if you will, by the biophysics movement of 1847. There were very famous scientists who said all that mental-cause stuff is nonsense; all that life-force stuff is nonsense; everything in life and mind can be understood and explained when reduced to physics and chemistry, and we are going to go out and show that. These are the famous students of Muller: DuBois-Reymond, Brucke, Ludwig, and Helmholtz.
This is where part of the history of psychoanalysis goes off a cliff, in my view, because you look at this group and look at Sigmund Freud and you say, Oh yes, Sigmund Freud studied in Brucke's lab. He loved Brucke's lab. He was deeply committed to those ideas. So you have Siegfried Bernfeld (1944) and others saying, "Well, Freud and the school of Helmholtz." How do you square a model that rids you of mind, with Freud's twenty-some volumes on psychic influences? It does not seem to make a lot of sense, but in fact there is sense to it. After 1875, this reductionist movement had run aground. There was a limit to their technology and what they could do, and nowhere was the limit more obvious than in psychology. So DuBois-Reymond (1874) talked about seven world mysteries that no science could ever understand. Three or four of them were core questions in psychology. If that was the only outcome of studying science and psychology, it would have been totally demoralizing to someone like Freud, who really wanted to merge those two things. But there was a response to this by a whole bunch of scientists who said: Well, in the way you view science, it may not be possible, but there are other ways of doing science. They pointed to something that has been forgotten in the history of psychoanalysis. That is the important movement of psychophysics, founded by Fechner. Basically Fechner said, There is an inner psychic world and there is an outer world of buzzing Newtonian physical energy. These are two sides of the same reality and neither can be reduced to the other. You have to try to understand them together and how they interact, so you cannot take the outer world and make it mind, and you cannot take the inner world like DuBois-Reymond did and make it into matter. You have to understand these things in conjunction with each other. This would have been dismissed if Fechner had not conducted twenty years of experiments to show how rich this approach would be. He was interested in perception. He was interested in what he called threshold experiences. He lit a candle, put it 300 yards away, and one could not see it. 290, 280, 270, one sees it. He is trying to measure and even quantify the energy to have this on-off experience.

His idea is that there is an unconscious that registers the light prior to 270, but that we have an adaptive capacity to winnow our conscious experience, and only take on an experience that reaches a certain intensity threshold. He is also going to try to think about inner psychophysics, the inner stimulations that register. He says, I am going to do that in a later book, a book that never comes, because he never found from his method how to do that. Still, this is a very important movement because it attracts Helmholtz himself, who leaves biophysics to study perception by understanding quantified energies and unconscious inferences, and how we know what we know from perception, with a model of energy and ideas. It affects deeply Ewald Hering, his student
Josef Breuer, and you get the rest, Sigmund Freud was deeply involved with Fechner when he tried to understand these questions.

Now it could be said that the first attempt that Freud took at building the model of mind, where psychic defense makes sense, was straight out of the biophysics playbook. His three teachers in Vienna were all strict biophysicists and all reductionist. It is worth noting that they have come under fire, heavy criticism for doing things like trying to explain ethics with physiology, and sticking ideas in neurons and pretending that they knew where that neurons’ location was. There was William James, Kraepelin—a good deal of controversy about this. Nonetheless, Freud was a good student. He sat down and wrote the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1950[1895]), right out of the biophysics playbook: mind follows the law of Newtonian physics; it is totally determined.

There are three different functions for neurons, he wrote, just as there are sensory and motor neurons; in the brain, there is a perception neuron, a memory neuron, a consciousness neuron. He explained it all and he woke up one day to realize that there are more questions raised by this than answers. This was the dry run for what was going to be Freud’s synthesis of biophysics and psychophysics. There was no longer an attempt to reduce psychic events to physical quantities. He had given up that major part of the biophysics commitment. So the mind-brain approach comes from psychophysics. This is why Paul Ricoeur is so smart: he figured it out without knowing the history, as far as I can tell; he realized Freud had a model that was hermeneutic, with explanations of mind, and meanings, and energy, and they are together. How weird! Well, not so weird—that is what the psychophysics people were trying to do and that was what Freud tried to do, and the only thing he changed in Fechner’s model was this: instead of an intensity threshold between the conscious and the unconscious, he made the threshold defended. Here we have Freud’s 1900 synthesis that derives from biophysics and psychophysics. With it he stabilized his object of study so that it does not flip back and forth. He has a brain/mind model that is materialistic, that allows for the examination of psychic defenses, as well as human subjectivity, agency and intention. This is in Chapter Seven of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900).

Freud, being Freud, he continues with the questions that his synthetic model brings forward. One of the big questions was, “What is in the unconscious?” In *The Interpretation of Dreams* there was this notion of unconscious wishes but he was not sure where they come from, and he says so very clearly. “This is like the Kantian thing in itself. It is unknowable in itself. We only know its derivatives in consciousness. We will never know what is in the unconscious. However five years later, he tells exactly what is in there via his engagement with sexology.
This is not the same as the study of sexual trauma, which had a history of many years with doctors. Freud started as a doctor interested in sexual trauma and with the seduction theory he formulated his theory: Hysteria is the negative of perversion. With that, he meant that the things that perverts do as an empirical act is precisely the same as what happens in the repression of the unconscious idea in the hysterical. Hysterics dream of things that perverts do and therefore if you study the acts of perversion, you have a window into the unconscious, and this makes him decide to study sexology, which is a fascinating field in itself.

Just as in the other disciplines, there was controversy and the main one, to be cartoonish, was male homosexuality. (For some reason that was what riveted people.) Was it caused by mindless bodies, that is to say, degenerative heredity, and therefore had nothing to do with you as a subject, your growth or development? Or was it caused by bodiless minds? Associationists said: you saw your mother, you saw the shoe, you developed a fetish at the age of five.

These were competing models, and Freud went in and found a synthetic model. But the synthesis he found for sexology actually answered lingering questions and pulled together a grand synthesis, all embodied in one highly-theorized word, that is, psychosexuality. In 1895, he postulated that traumatizing ideas were repressed in hysteria; these ideas were now defined as intolerable sexual ones. The source of unconscious wishing in dreams and phantasies from the unconscious is now defined as unconscious libido. And his synthesis for sexology was that sexual difference is not due to degeneration or a stray association, but rather psychobiological development based on psychosexuality. So psychosexuality answered lingering questions for Freud and it offered a link between reason and passion, mind and body, individuals and species, the human and the animal.

It made sense in a world dominated by positivism, Newton and Darwin. It was a very powerful model. Once you understand that this is how the first Freudian synthesis came together, it becomes simple to understand how the first Freudians came together. The first Freudians came from all these other disciplines, so Freud won followers from these areas. First of all, if you are German and Austrian and therefore anti-French, this is a safe way to be interested in French psychopathology. If you are a sexologist and want to widely expand your purview, this is a great deal. If you are instead against those fields, you have a new enemy, so a whole, an immediate kind of social battle is constructed because of these prior engagements and because of their status in particular cultures.
Therefore, I say that Freud did not so much start a revolution as that, rather, he took command of a revolution that was already in process.

Let's take a look at some of his friends and enemies. The first followers came from the Vienna Medical School. They were doctors and wanted some sort of therapeutic medical tool. They were trying hybrid therapies, electrical therapies and still using leeches, bleeding people. In 1900 they came to Freud because of therapeutic promise from his interests and his engagement. A second group were not interested in the therapy of individuals, but in the therapy of a culture. They were reformers, critics, from café society and the arts. There were several ethicists who felt that morality was such a sham that it was making people sick, making them neurotic. They had that belief before they read Freud and his Three Essays on Sexuality (1901-5). But when they read his essays, they put Freud on the cultural map. Very few people read The Interpretation of Dreams. Only doctors read Studies on Hysteria. The Three Essays were wildfire, because it made sense for people who saw the young men being led down a road to get syphilis because they were going to have sex with prostitutes. They were then going to infect virtuous and asexual women, and the whole thing was a sham. And if they masturbated the belief was that they were going to get neurotic. If they were abstinent, they also were going to get neurotic.

So there were the first Freudian groups. They were joined by the group in Zurich, academic psychiatrists focused on psychosis, in-patient units, labs. They were following Kraepelin and doing associational experiments. They were Protestants, mostly interested in the French Freud and the dream book, less interested in the sexology stuff.

So if you look at the Freudians in 1908, the first community, it was a very loose coalition, doctors, reformers, writers focused on anything that Freud was interested in. If you are interested in any part of it, you are in; it had a very porous boundary. If you are interested in the hysteria stuff, and did not believe that other stuff, that is fine. If you believe in degeneration theories, big deal. If you are interested in the sexology part, you are in. All you have to do is read the Wednesday Society meeting reports (Nunberg and Federn 1962-75) to see that the discussions are wild, all over the place. I call these people partial Freudians. If you make some commitment to Freud, you are in. Freud joked about this. He said that the group ranged from Bleuler to Gross: Bleuler, the academic psychiatrist, of great standing in the medical community, very serious Swiss German. Otto Gross a libertine, coke addict, preaching free love, sexual satisfaction of the transference, sexual revolution. Those are the ranges of the Freudians, who make centers in Vienna and Zurich. Zurich
is minting international Freidians, much more than Vienna. They have
students take their traditional European tour to see great exciting places
doing interesting things in medicine. They have an institution. Freud does
not have an institution. So if you look at who comes, the international
followers who come through Zurich—Ernest Jones, Abraham, Brill,
Ferenczi—they come to Zurich and they leave as Freidians. Now
there is also a new scientific credibility because of Jung's association
experiments. For standard academic psychiatrists they seemed to prove
in the language of scientific psychiatry and psychology that the Freudian
unconscious exists. This alerted them to the danger of the Freudian
movement and engendered a great attack. German psychiatrists started to
attack this community, so what happens?

In 1910 the congress in Nuremberg saw a radical shift in the psycho-
analytic community, effective overnight. The founding of the International
Psychoanalytic Association as a defense organization against external and
internal enemies, now made a uniform field.

There is a new boundary condition. Before it was anything Freud was
interested in. Now it was that you have to buy hook, line and sinker the libido
theory. You have to buy the whole psychosexual synthesis, not just a part of it.
You have to be a full Freudian. Otherwise you are outside. Overnight, they—
that is, Freud, Jung and Ferenczi—declare it and in fact they think that this
is going to hold the group together, get rid of wild analysis, get rid of all of
these things that the core elite did not believe and make a uniform field, which
would be less attacked by the German psychiatrists. Instead what happened
was the great schisms. The great important loss was Eugen Bleuler. He said
that he would not accept this doctrine on grounds of scientific freedom. This
is not the way scientific organizations run. There are ironies to that because
he was part of the abstinence movement and other movements that seemed
fairly parallel but suddenly overnight the Burghölzli with its labs and its
training facilities were out. The schisms with Stekel and Jung over the issue
of psychosexuality followed.

So what does this organization look like in 1914? It is very different. What
you have now is a number of small schools, organized around the authority of
a charismatic leader, very small groups: Jungians who call themselves analytic
psychologists, Stekel who had a small group; Adler who was operating in
Vienna, called his The Society for Free Psychoanalytic Inquiry—that was
the name of his troop, when he was kicked out—and then Freud with his
IPA. This is the way these guys always have been. They schism. Charismatic
authority becomes the game.
Most people skip from this point to 1980 in New York. By skipping, they miss a very powerful and important part of our history. What happened next, I call Making Psychoanalysis.

I argue that, instead of this model persevering for the next fifty years for the Freudians, it undergoes a radical change. Instead of the Freudians becoming more narrow, searching for confirmations of libido theory, they explode, and in that exploding they have to find a new way of organizing their community and that is what I call psychoanalysis.

The story starts with World War I, and the extraordinary unleashing of death and trauma. Everything in the IPA and the journals—everything stops. Freud and his colleagues hunt the great big question of the time, which is the military psychiatry question. What is war neurosis? People are losing 20-30% of their troops to hysterical conversions, and if you can figure the answer to that, you are going to become an institution overnight. So people were thinking about this question. A number of them asked; “What does this French soldier, with his gait disturbance after having been in a bunker when a bomb went off very close to him – what does this possibly have to do with sexuality?”

Freud tried to come up with the answer. Ultimately he started to think maybe Adler and Stekel had a point about a primary aggressive drive. It was difficult to ascribe aggression and savagery only to Oedipal competition and anal sadism. Then Freud changed his mind. Here is a guy famous for a theory. There is a great deal that goes with that. He is no longer a young man. Yet overnight he decides, “Well, maybe that is wrong.”

*Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920-22) introduced the death drive. This is after the schism where his loyal accolades were fighting tooth and nail with people very dear to them, and kicked him out, ostracized them from the movement because there was only one definition of the unconscious. Freud said, Well, maybe not. It is just a theory. Maybe we should not take it too seriously. When Freud wrote this, he put dynamite in the Freudian house. And then, Freud said, the old model for the Freudian community was that if you were Freudian and if you believed what Freud believed, his charismatic authority was the defining element of that group. Now he had a great problem, because there was more than one Freud. The Freud they had fought for and committed to now had changed his mind.

I argue that Freud, wittingly or not, undermined his own authority as the leader of the narrow school. In the next fifteen years Sigmund Freud would not dictate the rules of this community. He would be opposed and rejected on a series of defining matters and instead psychoanalysis would be dominated
not by a man but by four powerful communities: London, Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna.

What were some of the things they did to organize the community so that it would not be built around what was in the unconscious? Firstly, an emphasis on technique emerged. Ferenczi and Rank's book on technique was very promising. Unfortunately they had political enemies in Berlin. Their pitch, to try to stay experience-near and to think about the analytic situation, was undermined by their own extraordinary speculative works, published almost simultaneously. These showed the group that they were acting in bad faith. What else? There were propositions for institutionalization and professionalization, founding the Berlin clinic, leading to more experience-near character work and – this is very important – Wilhelm Reich's technical seminars. So between 1918 and 1933 there was a great outpouring of psychoanalytic thinking. It was a time of extraordinary blossoming and of course that stopped overnight in 1933 with the destruction of the Berlin psychoanalytic community.

After the Nazis came to power, a number of the Berliners fled, a number of the Jews and Marxists were on the run. Suddenly there were these very important controversies at the center of the field. In fact there was a lot of autonomy to think what you want to think, competing models of mind, theory, technique. But two of the four communities that contributed to this outpouring disappeared almost overnight, Berlin because of the Nazis, and Budapest because it was dependent on Sándor Ferenczi who died. Suddenly there were two centers left, London and Vienna.

In fact it seemed very unclear how these ideas would by synthesized. Then two of that minority, female lay analysts, put forward synthetic models, Melanie Klein in London and Anna Freud in Vienna. These become organizing syntheses that were in competition, each trying to pull together the multiple strands of psychoanalysis. Anna Freud especially, with her "I" psychiatry tried to pull everyone in except the Kleinians. She asked the same question I ask today: What unites psychoanalysis? She was accused of being unanalyzed, not part of the orthodox. She was stung by this accusation and sensitive to it. She said, To be an analyst one must impartially examine the part of the mind that manifests itself through the most experience-near empirical aspect of the minds and that is the "I." If you start in this way, you are a psychoanalyst. Your conclusions can be very different about what you find, but if you start with the most empirical experience-near aspect of inner life that means you are a psychoanalyst. Famously, she avoids in her book
(1936) saying anything about the nature of the unconscious. She does not go there. Fenichel, Hartmann and a number of people were extremely excited by this, and felt that this was a way forward. Fenichel became so excited that he commenced his synthesis of technique, which became so important. So in 1938, again, this community changes.

Let's look at it. What are the new border commitments? Common technique: if you analyze transference and resistance, you are an analyst. You are in. If you do not, you are out. Professional training: Increasingly, you have to go through an institute. There is an increased emphasis on what is experience-near and empiric, rather than the structures of the unconscious. Once you get inside the border, there is a lot of theoretical autonomy to argue about the nature of the unconscious, the theory of mind, the theory of cure. This, unfortunately, is rather important to underline, because it is going to end with the exile of psychoanalysis from Western and Central Europe.

Something else develops in exile when the Europeans arrive in London and New York and great debates are again engendered. The questions are: How do we define our community? Are we Freudians? Do we define ourselves by a commitment to Sigmund Freud and his teachings? Or are we psychoanalysts who are indebted to Freud? In that little difference of phrasing lay a gulf, and warfare. These were the arguments that charged the controversial discussions in London. There the psychoanalytic community fractured, but did not break, because Sylvia Payne orchestrated a compromise that continues to this day. It includes separate tracks for Kleinians, Anna Freudians and Independents. In New York similar battles erupted. The Viennese took over the New York Psychoanalytic from Rado who was a Berliner. Rado then forms Columbia's institute but he stays in the IPA. Horney secedes. The same argument goes on: this is not psychoanalysis, or this is not Freudian.

In summary, psychoanalysis was a powerful synthesis that offered a scientifically plausible model for subjectivity. It conformed to adjacent sciences and employed theoretical models and clinical data to support its claims. However, a fundamental problem ran throughout its history: How can one stabilize a science of subjectivity? Charismatic authority? Enforced commitment to unprovable truths so disturbing that they must be protected? Common modes of investigation, a common process of professionalization, a commitment to empiricism? The question remains a pressing one for us today.
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